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Owen Goldin

Self, Sameness, and Soul
in «Alcibiades I» and the «Timaeus»

Whatever its authorship, the Socratic dialogue known to us as
Alcibiades /shares
one prominent feature with some key dialogues generally
recognized as written by Plato: within it an allusion is made to a primary
principles of being or knowledge, which allusion is supported not by the
extended argument one might expect given the importance of the subject,
but by some schematic and obscure remarks. The prime example of
this in the Platonic writings is of course the allusion to the Form of the
Good within the Republic (504b6-507e2); although Socrates indicates
the nature of the Form of the Good by the extended comparison with
the sun, he proclaims both his inability to give and the inability of his
interlocutors to understand an adequate philosophic account of its true
nature (506c2-e2). Similar remarks apply to the allusion to the Form of
the KaÂov in the Symposium (210el-212a7) and «the Precise Itself» in
the Statesman (284cl—2). In Alcibiades such an allusion is made to a
principle called «the Self Itself»: at 129bl and 130d4 Socrates identifies
the knowledge of this as a prerequisite for an adequate account of
human nature, «what we ourselves are». So little is said about the «Self
Itself» that any account of its meaning and philosophical importance in
Alcibiades must be even more speculative than accounts of the nature
of the Good, the Beautiful, the Precise Itself, or the metaphysical
principles that are identified in Aristotle's reports of Plato's oral teachings.
But because of the manifest importance the Socrates ol Alcibiades takes
the Self Itself to have, the author of this dialogue is apparently inviting
the reader to make such speculations. I here begin this enterprise,
drawing attention to indications of the author's meaning in both what is
explicitly said about «the Self Itself» as well as other parts of the
dialogue, fully aware that my account can be at best probable. I shall argue
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in favor of R. E. Allen's proposal that the Self Itself is the Form of the
Self, and shall explore (as Allen does not) the philosophical significance
of this. I shall suggest that this form is here taken to be an ontological
principle on account of which each thing is the self it is as well as a
principle of knowledge, by virtue of which anything is recognized as a
self. I compare the form of the aùxô alluded to in Alcibiades with the
form of the aùxô (the Form of the Same) discussed in the Sophist and
argue that the mutual interdependence of the Same and the Different
recognized in the Sophist could be one philosophical motivation for the
revised account of the ontological constitution of soul presented in the
Timaeus: no longer is the ultimate constituent of soul taken to be a single
form of the aùxô, but the forms of both the aùxô and the sxepov.

I

I

The whole of the Alcibiades is a discussion of Socrates and the
young Alcibiades, in which the latter is shown to be ignorant of the
things he needs to know in order to successfully pursue his ambitions to
lead the Athenian community. In a recent paper1, Julia Anna has shown
how the theme of self-knowledge unites this discussions's long string of
apparently disjointed arguments. In the course of the first part of the
dialogue, Socrates shows Alcibiades that the latter does not possess an
understanding of the good for either the community or the individual
(106c4— 127d8) ; in revealing to Alcibiades his own ignorance of this
Alcibiades is in effect coming to know himself, and is already improving
his lot, since the greatest of all evils, according to Socrates, is ignorance
of one's ignorance (116e5-l 18c2).
After bidding Alcibiades to attend to himself (127d9-e7), Socrates
begins questioning Alcibiades on what Alcibiades' self is, as contrasted
with whatever belongs to his self (128d9-129al). Socrates asks: «Come
then, in what way might the Self Itself (aùxô xaùxô) be discovered? For
thus we might at some point discover whatever we are, but perhaps it is
impossible while we are ignorant of this», to which Alcibiades (surely
not in a better position than we to grasp Socrates' meaning) responds:
«What you say is correct» (129bl-4). Socrates then argues that the self is
the soul on the basis of the principle that that which employs an
instrument is always different from the instrument that is employed.
The human self is either soul, body, or a complex of the two; since a
human being employs the body as an instrument, the body cannot be the
Self-knowledge in Early Plato, in: Platonic Investigations, D.J. O'Meara, ed.
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985), pp. 111-38.
1
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of the elements of that
in the activity of ruling that must be characteristic

self, nor can the soul/body complex, since one

complex does not engage
of the self. This leaves the soul as the self, and the body as that
which belongs to the self. Socrates concludes: «Do you need it further
demonstrated in some clearer way that the soul is a human being?»
Alcibiades responds: «By Zeus, it seems to me to be sufficiently
demonstrated.»
(129b5-130c7) Socrates continues: «It is enough for us if it is
demonstrated not precisely (àKptflrâç) but suitably (petp(coç) for we will
know precisely when we discover what we have now passed over on
account of the length of the inquiry. » — «What is that?», Alcibiades asks.
«What we just mentioned, that we ought to first investigate what the self
itself is,» Socrates responds. «But now instead of the Self Itself we
investigated what each thing is (vCv ôè àvui roß aùxoù aùxô stcaaxov
èoKsppeha xi soxi)2. And perhaps that will suffice, for we can say that
nothing is more authoritative over ourselves (f)g©v aßxcöv) than the
soul» (130c5—d7).

This is all that is explicitly said of «the Self Itself» in the dialogue.
The Self Itself is here posited as an object of knowledge, to be discovered
by inquiry and then to serve as the basis for a «demonstration» of the
nature of the human self. Like an Aristotelian àp^fj (principle), it is to
render intelligible derivative truths to which it is epistemically prior.
But there is no evidence at all that the author of the Alcibiades
conceives of «demonstrations» as logical deductions from indemonstrable
premises and there is no direct evidence here that a principle such as a
definition of the Self Itself is taken to be an expression of a fact with
causal as well as epistemic priority, as is the case with Aristotelian first
principles.'
What might this principle called «the Self Itself» be?
A neoplatonic interpreter would expect Plato to say that an adequate
account of the human self can be grounded only on that of the most
authoritative element of the human soul. Neoplatonic commentaries of
which we have evidence do indeed interpret «the Self Itself» in this
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way3, and this has been the conventional interpretation for many
years4. It has recently been defended by Annas (131-132). But in spite
of its distinguished history I take this interpretation to be mistaken.
R. E. Allen has argued that the formulation «the x itself» (x aùxo), as
contrasted with «each x» (x etcacxov) indicates that the author wishes to

contrast a form, as opposed to a particular partaking of that form 5.
Annas claims that any reference to the «theory of Forms» here «would
be wildly out of place» and suggests that the second aùxô in the phrase
aùxo xaùxô simply signifies «the real...» The Self-Itself would be the real
self, «soul conceived of impersonally, a[n]... impersonal self which, like
a Form, is the same in all its instances» (Annas 131). As Annas reads the
dialogue, the conclusion that Socrates and Alcibiades reach, that the real
self is the soul only tells us what the each individual human being is.
Socrates takes it to be provisional because he is demanding an account of
the human self that tells us what there is in the soul that transcends each
soul's particularity. This will be «the Self Itself,» what the soul really is
that aspect of the soul that is shared by all rational souls. But it is not
clear how the adjective aùxo («itself»), even in contrast to SKaoxov, can
be give the sense of «impersonal.» Why the contrast between aùxo xö x
and SKaoxov xô x should be the contrast between what a thing really is
and what it is in its particularity is scarcely intelligible in the absence of
an account of why a particular x is not the real x. Indeed in this case the
contrast, as understood in this way, is on the face of it even more
implausible, since what is being sought is the real self, the real particular
thing as it is. Why should what x shares with another be more the self of
x than what x does not share?

There was a dispute among the neopiatonists as to exactly what aùxô xaùxô is.
Proclus took it to be the rational part of the soul, which is such as to use the body as an
instrument. Damascius took it to be intellect, pure of all association of the body. This
controversy is discussed in: A. Ph. Segonds, éd., and tr., Proclus: Sur le Premier Alcibiade
de Platon (Paris: Société d'Edition «Les Belles Lettres», 1985), I, liii-lxii. For the
evidence, see G. Kroll, ed., Proclus: In Piatonis Rem Publicam Commentarii (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1899), 1.171.23-172.6, and L.G. Westerink, ed., Olympiodorus: Commentary
on the First Alcibiades of Plato (Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1982), 203.20-205.7. (The
Olymiodorus text is reprinted, with translation and notes, in: Segonds II, 374—75, 46061.)
4
W. Jaeger, Aristotle, trans. R. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd. ed. 1948),
p. 165, n. 1; R. S. Bluck, The Origin of the Greater Alcibiades, Classical Quarterly n.s. 3
(1953) p. 46.
5
R. E. Allen, Note on Alcibiades I, 129B1, in: American Journal of Philology 82
(1962), pp. 87-90.
5
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Plato provides such an account of why this should be the case in
other dialogues when he argues for the forms as grounding the
intelligibility of things. More precisely, he provides several such accounts, for
there is more than one philosophical motivation for positing the forms.
In the Euthyphro the holy itself is identified as that by which all holy
things are holy, the cause of any particular's being holy (Euthjphro
6dl0-el). In the Symposium the beautiful itself is identified as that whose
beauty is not restricted to any given perspective, that which truly is
intrinsically beautiful, not merely appearing beautiful on account of the
percipient's being related to it in a certain way. In the Republic both
strategies are employed, along with Parmenidean considerations of the
atemporality of the verb «to be.» It is not clear which strategy would be
employed here to argue for a form of the anxö. But some such account
must be implied or alluded to for there to be any plausibility to the
suggestion that the real self is that which all selves have in common.
This is why I take Allen to be correct in taking the Self Itself to be a Form
of the self.
Of course in such dialogues as the Euthyphro, it is not at all clear
whether that form that is denoted as an x itself is taken to have an
ontological status independent from that of the particular x's that
partake of it. Since a
metaphysical account of the nature of the forms is
absent in Alcibiades I, too, the case is similar here. All we can say at this
point is that the form of the aùxô is that which is expressed in an
adequate definition of the self. It is that whose apprehension allows us to
fully recognize an anxö as an aùxô and that on account of which an aùxô
really is an aùxô. The anxö itself is to be taken as having both epistemic
and causal priority, though it may or may not have ontological
independence.

What, then, would the form of the anxö be? This depends on the
sense given to the second anxö in anxö xanxö. One could take anxö not as
«self» but simply as the third person personal pronoun. Socrates would
then be claiming that the answer «who are we?» is to be attained
through discovering the «it itself,» where «it» (anxö) is a variable
standing for any attribute or thing. This is apparently the line of thinking
that led Friedländer to take anxö xanxö as «the self in respect to its
essence» («das Selbst seinem Wesen nach»)6, which he interprets not as
Der Grosse Alcibiades, Ein Weg zu Plato, 2 vols. (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1921, 1923),
where
Friedländer consistently translates the first aùxô in aùxô xô aùxô as «es».
p. 17,
6

II,

See:
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single form of selfhood7, but as an allusion to «die Sphäre des AnSich,» that is, to the whole realm of the forms, here «von fern in den
Blick gebracht»8. But in presenting the inquiry in such an indeterminate
fashion, Socrates would in effect be looking for a swarm of answers,
seeking a form for anything that we can call an «it.» This hardly seems
an appropriate prerequisite for the task of self-knowledge proposed as
necessary for someone in Alcibiades' place. Perhaps Friedländer reads
Socrates as saying that self-knowledge must rest on an awareness that
there is such a thing as a realm of forms (as opposed to some specific
form) but the text cannot support the weight of such an interpretation.
a

A second option is taken by Allen (188-189): The second aùxo in
aùxô to aùxô here is «self». What is being demanded is not an
apprehension of a form for
everything that we can call an aùxô but a single
form responsible for the fact that anything that we can call an aùxô is, in
fact, the self that it is. I accept this interpretation as the most reasonable
of those available. But Allen does not speculate on the philosophical
meaning of the passage, and remains silent on the issues of the nature of
the form of the Self envisaged here and how the apprehension of this
would aid in the acquisition of self-knowledge.
Let us assume that here, as in the recognized early and middle
Platonic dialogues, a form of x is both a causal principle that makes an x
an x and an epistemic principle on the basis of which we truly recognize
an x as being an x. If aùxô xaùxô is a form of the self, it will consequently
be a causal principle that makes every self a self and allows us to know
that every self is the self. The role played by such a principle would be
similar to that played by the form of the aùxô, discussed in the Sophist9.
In contrast to the form of the aùxo in Alcibiades I, aùxô is there taken as

This is how Allen, art. cit., p. 189, n. 6, interprets Friedländer, thus taking
to anticipate his own proposal.
8
P. Friedländer, Plato, 2 vols., trans. H. Meyerhoff (New York: Pantheon Books,
1964), II, p. 242. See also Friedländer (1923), II, p. 18, where the phrase aùrô to aùro is
taken to be an «allgemeinster Hinweis auf die ideelle Sphäre», and II, p. 62, where the
reference is called an «ablehnende Hindeutung auf die eigentliche Seinsphäre.»
9
I here leave open the question of whether forms in Alcibiades I and the Sophist are
taken to ontologically independent of what participates in them, as they are often said to be
in the middle dialogues.
7

Friedländer

Self, Sameness, and Soul in «Alcibiades I» and the «Timaeus»

11

relational: («... the same as...»)10. An x is said to be the same as a y by
virtue of the participation of both x and y in this form (254dl4—255c7).
But the only value of «y» that will be such as to render «x is the same as
y» true will be one that refers to the same thing to which «x» refers. The
form of «... the same as...» will consequently be the cause of each thing's
being itself. Because the discussion in the Sophist has as its aim an
analysis of the truth and falsity of statements, the Eleatic stranger never
considers whether the form of the aùxô has a role in making an individual
what it is. The Socrates of Alcihiades I, in contrast, is explicitly
inviting us to speculate on how the form of the amô makes a self.
But what is a self? Here the text gives us no help, and we can only
speculate on the line of thought of the author of Alcibiades I. A self is
anything that can be referred to by some form of aùxoç, the third person
pronoun. Hence any being is a self. (A similar point is made by Plato in
the Sophist when it is indicated that anything that partakes in Being will
partake in «... the same as...» in respect to itself [256al2—bl, cf. 254dl4—
15]). It follows that the form of the Self is that which will be responsible
for any thing's being the very thing it is. It will also be that principle the
apprehension of which is in every case necessary in order that one know
a thing to be the self it is.
The parallels to the form of the Good as described in the Republic
should be clear. Just as the Self Itself is a principle that makes anything
the self it is, and is thus responsible for its very being, the form of the
Good is responsible for the being of the forms (509a9—blO), which in
turn is responsible for there being images of that form. And just as the
Self Itself must be known to know each thing as the self it is, so the form
Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and
Co., 1957), p. 285, and K. Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1969), p. 194, n. 67. This is denied by J. Duerlinger, in: «The Ontology of Plato's
Sophist: The Problems of Falsehood, Non-Being, and Being», The Modern Schoolman 65
10

See F.

(1988) p. 170 n. 18. For Duerlinger, to be the same is in the Sophist always «to be the same
in respect to itself», a self-identity that properly only holds of forms. But there is no hint in
the Sophist that Plato is here concerned with the falsity of those particulars that are
imperfect images of the forms, the exemplars. The falsity with which he is concerned is the
falsity of propositions, which, like «Theaetetus flies» (263a8), need not concern forms.
Interestingly, at 255cl2-d8 «the Different» (to Gatepov) is said to be different from
being (to ôv) on account of the fact that the latter is said in itself (koG' aùto) and in respect to
another (ttpoç ëtepov), while the former is said only in a relational way. In not employing
this argument in respect to the same (to aùto) Plato seems to me to be implying that the
Same, like Being, is said both in itself and in respect to another. In Alcibiades I the form of
the aùto is considered only Ka0' auto.
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of the Good must

be apprehended to ground those «hypotheses» that

serve as the bases for our understanding of the various things there are,
allowing one to be able to distinguish each form (510b2— 51 ld5, 533bl—

534d2). Further, in both cases the apprehension of the principle is a
necessary foundation for the art of ruling. Alcibiades must grasp the
form of the self before he can know himself, and he must know himself
before he knows what he must learn to rule (127d4— 129al0). Later in
the dialogue such self-knowledge is identified as ococppoanvr| (131b4,
133c 18-19) and its political importance is argued for on other grounds:
without a knowledge of himself (which must rest on a knowledge of the
Self Itself) Alcibiades will be unable to know which things belong to
himself (that is, the body) and will therefore be ignorant of material
goods, the things that belong to what belongs to himself. It follows that
he will be ignorant of the things that belong to others in the same
respects, the material goods that are the usual concern of political
deliberation11. Further, without the virtue of acocppootivr) that is selfknowledge, Alcibiades will be unable to impart this virtue to his
subjects, and hence improve their selves (133c 18— 134c8). Similarly, in the
Republic, the rulers of the polis must apprehend the form of the Good if
they are to know what is good and what is not in their city (534b8-d2,

540a6-b5).
The account of the form of the Good is, of course, much more
elaborate; though deliberately couched in metaphorical terms, its dis-

Presumably Socrates is not saying that all of the various rexvai that improve the
body or produce material goods themselves require a knowledge of the self. It is their
proper use that requires a knowledge of the self, for without this knowledge one would be
unaware of the relation these things have to the self, and hence of the circumstances in
which they could benefit or improve the self. This is what Socrates means when he affirms
that the self-knowledge that is ooxppocnivri is necessary for us to know which of our things
are good or bad (133c21-24). aco<ppooi3vr| is here implicitly identified as the knowledge of
what is good or bad for the self, which is the implicit teaching of the Charmides (174al0~
d7. See T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 76, 88, 299
n. 46.) This understanding of aoxppoauvq escapes the objections Socrates poses in the
Charmides against Critias' identification of aaxppoaùvr| as self-knowledge (164d3174bl0), for these hold only if the È7utarf|gT| that is oco<ppocnvr| is taken to be similar in
function and structure to the various particular È7ticxfjp.ai or rs^vcu. See G. Klosko, The
Technical Conception of Virtue, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (1981), p. 102;
D. L. Roochnik, Terence Irwin's Reading of Plato, in: C. L. Griswald, Jr, ed., Platonic
Writings/Platonic Readings, (New York: Routeledge, 1988), pp. 191—92. In Alcibiades I,
the further claim is made that adequate self-knowledge or coi<ppocn3vr| must rest on a
theoretical understanding of the nature of our selves, our souls. For without this we are
unable to fully understand what is good for us.
1

'
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cussion justifies certain claims about it that cannot at this point be
asserted of the form of the Self. Not only must the Good be known for
anything else to be truly known, it functions as a source of intellectual
light, bestowing intelligibility as well as being on anything that is
knowable (507c6-509a5). In addition, the forms are explicitly posited in
Republic V as the only intelligible entities. Even if the forms are implicitly
present in Alcibiades I, as I believe they are, the discussion in this
dialogue has as its aim the knowledge of Alicibiades' own self,
provisionally identified as his soul. It is not at all clear that Alcibiades' soul
would be taken to truly be orbe knowable according to the metaphysical
and epistemological accounts given in the Republic.
Further, as G. Santas has argued12, Plato conceives of the form of
the Good as that form responsible for the «ideal attributes» of the forms,
those attributes such as immutability, independent existence, and
intelligibility that inhere in a form not by virtue of that of which the form is a
form, but by virtue of its being a form at all. This function seems to be
absent from the Self Itself, unless one is to say that the only true self is a

form. To say this would be consonant with Republic V, according to
which any x other than the form of x is not x as well as x, but there is no
hint of this in Alcibiades I. After all, unless Alcibiades' soul is the form of
Alcibiades, Republic V would have Alcibiades' soul be both Alcibiades'
self and not his self, contradicting the express though provisional
identification in Alcibiades of the self of a particular human as the particular
soul.

I

To sump up, when Socrates says that a precise understanding of who
we ourselves are must rest on an apprehension of the Self Itself, he is
identifying the Form of the Self as that which must be apprehended for
there to be adequate understanding of what any particular thing (or self)
is. If the form of the Self conforms to the understanding of forms put
forward in Plato's middle dialogues, we can conclude that such a form
not only allows us to know other forms, but is responsible for the fact
that any other thing is the self it is. I have indicated the respects in which
this is similar to the form of the Good as described in the Republic and
the respects in which the comparison may not hold.

The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic, in: J. Anton and A. Preus, eds., Essays
in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983),
pp. 232-63.
12
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Admittedly, the evidence on which these speculations rest is thinner
than one might hope. As Socrates indicated at 130c8-d7, it was enough
for his immediate purpose (having Alcibiades act in accordance with
Gcotppooijvri by primarly caring for the soul, not the body and what
belongs to it) to have identified the self with the soul, without
investigating what the soul really is. But within the rest of the dialogue there
are more indications that the author of Alcibiades subscribed to a
metaphysics along these lines. These indications further support the
interpretation suggested above.
After having determined that the person is the soul, Socrates and
Alcibiades turn to the issue of how knowledge of oneself, acû<ppocn3vr|, is
possible. Socrates remarks that just as the eye cannot see itself but needs
a mirror or other reflecting surface, so the soul can only know itself as
reflected in something else. Among human beings, the eye is best
reflected within the best part of other peoples' eyes, their pupils, the
parts responsible for the arete of eyes, the ability to see (132c7— 133b6).
So among human beings one's soul is best reflected in the most divine
part of another soul : that responsible for the ability to think and know
(tö eiôevat te Kai cppoveïv) (133cl—2). By doing so one comes to know
all that is divine, God and thought (Geöv te Kai <ppövr|otv)... and oneself
(133c4—6). Here the dramatic context of the dialogue mirrors the
philosophic teaching, for it is through engaging in precisely the kind of
discussion represented in the dialogue that Alcibiades will come to see
the nature of his own soul through the medium of the thought of
Socrates. Further, the imagery of eye looking into eye reflects the erotic
nature of the new relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades13,
which Socrates had earlier described as based on a love between soul and
soul, not soul and body (131el0—11).
There follows a disputed passage, found only in a quotation from the
Christian writer Eusebius, in which Socrates claims that, just as the eye
will best see itself not in another eye, but in a pure and shining mirror, so
a soul will best see itself not in another human soul but in that pure and
shining mirror which is ô 9eoç, the god (133c8—17). The dialogue
concludes with the aforementioned application of these results to
Alcibiades' political ambitions: one must know oneself before one can take
good care of others and the things that belong to others.

I

Forde, On the Alcibiades I, in: T. Pangle, ed., The Roots of Political
Philosophy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 236.
13

See S.
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Although there are internal considerations that support the authenticity
of the passage from Eusebius, scholarly debate has not resolved the
question14. If the passage is genuine, we see Socrates again making the
claim that fully adequate self-knowledge must rest on our apprehending
some single principle other than ourselves considered in our particularity.
This divine principle is not only said to have an affinity with the
soul (on account of their both having an intellectual nature); the true
human self is said to be best known through knowledge of the latter.
This again indicates that the human soul is what it is through some kind
of unity with a single divine principle. As earlier, such a principle is
identified as knowable, and the knowledge of this is again identified as
necessary for fully adequate self-knowledge. The full metaphysical role
of this divine principle is left unclear; there is no suggestion here, as
there is in the Republic for the form of the Good (509a9—blO), that this
principle is responsible for the being (or self hood) of the forms, or
anything else, for that matter. Nonetheless, an identification of the Self
Itself and ô 0soç is at least invited15. Were this identification to be what
the author has in mind, we would have here an anticipation of the
neoplatonic doctrine that the primal source of the soul is also the primal
source of all other things (i.e. all other selves).
On the other hand, even if we reject the disputed lines, we still have
the finest part of the soul, that which thinks, labelled «divine,» considered
knowable, and such that knowledge of it provides access to
knowledge of God and <ppôvr|oiç (133c 1-7). This indicates that attribute
by virtue of which we are human thinking souls is shared by a
divinity, and that the knowledge of what is divine is required for

The phrase to Ostov Kai Äagtipov at 134d5 apparently refers back to this passage;
nowhere else is the pupil said to be shining. See R. S. Bluck, The Origin of the Greater
Alcibiades, art. cit., p. 46, n. 2; P.M. Clark, The Greater Alcibiades, CQ n.s. 5 (1955),
pp. 23-37. Friedländer (1964), p. 351, n. 14, argues that the comparison of the eye to
a mirror is sufficient to ground Socrates' assertion Alcibiades must look to what is
14

Äa|Dipöv.

This helps resolve the conceptual difficulty Annas, art. cit. (131 n. 51), finds with
the disputed passage. She remarks that earlier in the dialogue God is said to be found within
one's soul, through the medium of the another's soul. In this passage, on the other hand,
God is posited as knowable directly, as an entity exterior to the soul. But if God is the Form
of the Self, God will be recognized both mediately, within the human soul (as the principle
of sameness that makes possible the recognition of any being as the self it is as well as the
principle responsible for the fact that the soul is the self it is) and (perhaps) immediately,
outside the soul, as that principle responsible for each thing's being the self it is.
15
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adequate self-knowledge. The identification of a single divine principle
with the Self Itself is still hinted at, albeit more faintly16.
Alcibiades is portrayed at the very beginning of his philosophical
apprenticeship to Socrates, so it should not be surprising that the goal of
philosophical inquiry, as the Socrates of this dialogue understands it,
should be merely indicated. Yet the indications point in a definite
direction. I have here tried to summon all of those indications which
render plausible the view that what is being indicated is a principle of
being and knowledge playing a role in several important respects like
that of the form of the Good of the Republic.
It should be noted that the imagery with which the fundamental
principles of the two dialogues are described differs in important
respects. The form of the Good is described as though it an object of vision,
like the sun, discovered by looking outward17. This well suits the general
terms in which philosophical inquiry is described in the Republic:
one must travel out from one's habitual ways of thinking and acting to
perceive the truth that is always present in the world, regardless of
people's beliefs. There oo)(ppoahvr| is taken to be a state of harmony
reason imposes on the rest of the soul by virtue of the external truths it

(442cl0-d3, 485dl0-e6, 500c4—d9, 592b2-6). According to the
imagery of Alcibiades I, on the other hand, the Self Itself is discovered by
looking inward, through the intermediacy of the soul of the beloved in
an erotic activity that leads to, not, as in other erotic activity, away from,
the self-mastery that is owcppoowr]. Like the theory that learning is
recollection as presented in the Meno, Phaedo, and Phaedrus, the account
of learning as an erotic process, by which one sees one's inmost self
through the true self of the other, serves to indicate the affinity one's
soul has to the objects of knowledge and the ultimate principles of

grasps

being.

I

have been silent on the issue of the authorship of
Alcibiades I. In respect to this issue, Annas has persuasively made three
points: that the arguments against the authenticity of the dialogue are
inconclusive and largely amount to a verdict of taste, that even if the

Up until now

This part of the text, read with or without the disputed lines, indicates that the Self
the
Itself,
apprehension of which Socrates takes to be necessary for real self-knowledge, is
not just a definition of a term, but a grasp of the being of some thing (whether subsisting
apart from the individual selves or not).
17
See the analogy of the cave in the beginning of Bk. 7, and especially 518c4-d2.
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dialogue is not by Plato, it is still of philosophical interest and for that
reason alone is worthy of study, and that if we entertain the hypothesis
that the dialogue is by Plato we may well shed light on aspects of the
accepted Platonic canon (114—115, 133). In the final part of this paper I
would like to show how, if my interpretation of the Self Itself is correct,
and if the dialogue is taken to be by Plato, an interesting development
can be discerned in Plato's thoughts on the ontological constitution of
the soul.
I have argued that within Alcibiades the form of the Self is
identified as an
important constituent of the individual human soul, and that
it serves as the ground of both the selfhood of all individuals (including
the individual human souls) and the soul's ability to recognize things or
kinds as the selves they are. But of course Alcibiades is not the only
dialogue in which the problem of the nature of the soul is raised. One of
the major interpretive puzzles such dialogues as the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and the Republic present concerns the nature of the soul as Plato
conceives it. Is it in time, akin to the realm of becoming, as it would
seem it must be if it is to function as a source of motion? Or is it out of
time, akin to realm of the forms, as it would seem it must be if it is to
know them? This puzzle is explicitly addressed in the Timaeus' account
of the generation of the World Soul at 34c5-35a8. I quote the translation
of Cornford18, whose interpretation of this difficult passage, which
follows that of Proclus19 and Grube20, is now generally accepted.

I

I

The things of which he composed soul and the manner of its composition
were as follows: (1) Between the indivisible Existence (oùcha) that is ever in
the same state and the divisible Existence that becomes in bodies, he
compounded a third form of Existence composed of both. (2) Again, in the
case of Sameness and in that of Difference (xfiç xe xaùxoù (pûoecoç aù Jtépi Kai
xfjç xoù éxépou), he also on the same principle made a compound intermediate
between that kind of them which is indivisible and the kind that is
divisible in bodies. (3) Then, taking the three, he blended them all into a
unity, forcing the nature of Difference, hard as it was to mingle, into union
with Sameness, and mixing them together with Existence.

F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1937),
59-60.
pp.
19
Proclus, In Piatonis Timaeum Commentari, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner,
18

1904),

II,

p. 155.

G. M. A. Grube, The Composition
Classical Philology 27 (1932), pp. 80—82.
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Plato here presents a mythical account of the creation of the World Soul.
It is to be analyzed as a mixture of three constituents: an oùota
intermediate between indivisible oùcia and divisible oùota, a Sameness
intermediate between divisible sameness and indivisible sameness, and
a Difference intermediate between divisible difference and indivisible
difference. The fact that the soul's oùota is said to be a mixture of, and is
intermediate between, the oùota of the realm of forms and that of the
realm of becoming is clearly intended by Plato to be a recognition, if not
resolution, of the aforementioned difficulty. As interesting as this issue
is, I would like to here focus on the second part of this passage and how it
relates to Alcibiades I.
The second two constituents of the World Soul are a Sameness
which is a blend between the Sameness found in the Intelligible realm
and that found in the realm of becoming and a Difference which is
likewise a blend between the two kinds of difference. It is now generally
agreed that the intelligible Sameness and Difference are the forms of the
Same and the Different; this view, though bolstered by taking the
Timaeus to postdate the Sophist, does not rest on it21. So we again see the
form of the Same, analogous to what in Alcibiades is called the Self
Itself, posited as a basic constituent of soul. But here it is not the only
basic constituent of soul; it is accompanied by some constituents of the
realm of becoming (the realm of what in Alcibiades is called «each
self») as well as by two other aspects or parts of the intelligible realm, the
forms of Being and of Difference.
Plato later indicates that it is only by virtue of the forms of the Being,
the Same, and the Different, which have been posited as constituents of
the soul, that the soul is able to render the world intelligible. The soul
can recognize true beings, the forms, only by having intelligible being
within it. The soul can recognize that one form is the same as another
only by means of having within it the form of the Same. Similarly, the
soul can recognize that one form is different from another only by
having within it the form of the Different (37a2-b3). As Aristotle
recognized (DA I 2 404b 16-18), this is an application of the Empedo-

I

I

Cornford (1937),

pp. 64-66, takes the passage, as interpreted in this way, to
the
E. L. Owen, The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues
G.
Sophist.
presuppose
Classical Quarterly n.s. 3 (1953), p. 88, and T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 72-74 argue that this need not be so. Grube, art.
cit., p. 80, does not take a stand, but argues that the consonance of this interpretation with
the Sophist serves to support it.
21
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clean principle «like perceives like», which is employed later in the
Timaeus to account for vision (45c 1—d3). With this we can contrast the
doctrine of Alcibiades that there is a single form of the Same or the Self
that will make possible the soul's recognition of the various selves in the
world. Though Alcibiades does not exclude a doctrine of recollection,
according to which all forms are present in the soul, the form of the aùxô
is there given a unique privileged status not present in the account of the

I

I

Timaeus.

It is hard not to see the new account of the Timaeus as resulting from
(or at least an anticipation of) the results of the investigations of the
Sophist, according to which, if the forms are to be intelligible, and if one
is to escape the sorts of aporiai that arise in the second part of the
Parmenides from taking certain forms to have predicated of them only
themselves, the forms must result from an interweaving of the five great
Forms: Being, Motion, Rest, the Same, and the Different. Because all
Forms have the Same and the Different irreducibly present within
them, the soul that is to apprehend and distinguish the Forms must
likewise have within it the Form of the Different, as well as the Form of
the Same.
The authenticity ofAlcibiades has somestimes been rejected on the
grounds that within it are presented implausible anticipations of the
doctrines of post-Platonic thought22.1 have here made the case that, if
the Self Itself is interpreted as the Form of the Self, the dialogue can be
taken as suggesting philosophically interesting metaphysical and
psychological views consonant with those of Plato's middle period, and
that we can see how the metaphysics and psychology of the Sophist and
Timaeus could well have developed out of them23.

/

for example, Jaeger (1948), p. 165 n. 1 and Bluck, art. cit., pp. 46-52.
Earlier versions of this paper were read at a meeting of the Society for Ancient
Greek Philosophy at Baruch College in October, 1989 and the Thirteenth Annual Workshop
in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin in February, 1990.1 have
profited from the comments and suggestions made at that time. I am also indebted to two
of my students, William Lentz and Amy Whitworth, whose work in a graduate course on
Plato provided the impetus for the last part of this paper.
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